Central to the 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) is the concept of strategic competition, defined in the NSS as a new era of interstate rivalry characterized by “growing political, economic, and military competitions.” The NSS and NDS deprioritized threats that guided previous iterations of these documents, such
as terrorism, and instead elevated strategic competition with China and Russia as the proper focus of U.S. security policy. This reprioritization is based on China’s and Russia’s desires to
export their authoritarian models; erode the U.S.-led international order; and gain economic, political, and military influence over other countries. Therefore, the most recent NSS and NDS represent a paradigm shift from the low-intensity conflicts against nonstate actors that
the United States had been fighting since 2001. Instead, these strategies refocus U.S. national effort toward great-power competition—a peacetime competition between strong states—and
implicitly recognize that the global environment is no longer unipolar.
Although strategic competition is theoretically global in nature, recent U.S. competitive efforts have tended to concentrate on Asia and Europe. Focusing on these two regions reflects
another common theme of the NDS and NSS: the United States has finite resources and therefore must prioritize its activities. However, in much the same way that the Cold War was fought in countries outside the United States’ and Soviet Union’s respective spheres of influence, the periphery could once again play an important role in this new era of competition.
In this report, we examine strategic competition among the United States, China, and Russia in one such peripheral area. The Middle East is a region of interest for all three major
powers but not geographically adjacent to any of them, and all three countries have varying degrees of influence there. Given its historic role in the region, the United States is the dominant player compared with China and Russia, but the latter two are gaining ground in certain areas. Although the U.S. emphasis is on Europe and Asia as the primary areas for competition, further study is required to understand how U.S.-China-Russia competition—which will not be limited to those two regions—might unfold elsewhere. We examine Chinese and Russian actions using qualitative methods (historical research, analysis of primary and secondary sources, and interviews with policymakers and experts from
those countries) and quantitative ones (analysis of economic data, arms sales, and key leader engagements). We find that China is focused on economic access; Russia is primarily concerned with security issues. Thus, the United States will face different competitive dynamics with each.
A separate online appendix provides additional detail regarding (1) Chinese and Russian diplomatic, economic, and military engagement in the Middle East and (2)areas of strategic competition amongChina, Russia, and the United States in that region.
x Crossroads of Competition: China, Russia, and the United States in the Middle East
At the time of writing, there is little overlap in Chinese and Russian approaches to the region.
This has created a situation in which China and Russia both pursue their primary aims—and
the secondary aim of eroding U.S. influence and leverage—without creating friction in their
bilateral relationship. Despite the lack of competition between Beijing and Moscow to date, there
are discrete areas where a limited competitive dynamic could emerge in the future—particularly
in niche arms markets, such as unmanned systems, infrastructure contracts, and hydrocarbons.
Additionally, although competition is occurring, Chinese and Russian officials and analysts interviewed for this project all raised the potential for cooperation with the United States.
Whether these are mere talking points or represent a genuine aspiration is unclear, but it is
worth noting that cooperation could be beneficial to all parties—although this cooperation
should occur in a manner that does not give Beijing or Moscow an undue edge.
Ultimately, strategic competition is the stated policy driving U.S. policy toward and both of those countries include elements of strategic competition in their own policies and actions, with all three vying to improve their own
positions while eroding those of their competitors. Accordingly, there are several approaches
that U.S. policymakers can consider in seeking to improve the U.S. position vis-à-vis China
and Russia in the Middle East:
• There is much that the United States can do—if it so chooses—in the Middle East,
regardless of the activities of Russia and China. Examples are working to settle international disputes, helping build trade and investment relations between U.S. companies and
the region, and providing aid where necessary and useful. Such actions would reinforce
the role of the United States as the leading external power in the region.
• Some Chinese and Russian activities could be beneficial to countries in the region, such
as China’s infrastructure projects. The United States might engage to help local actors
take advantage of those activities in ways that magnify benefits to the region without disadvantaging the United States.
• Accordingly, the United States should be selective in the Chinese and Russian activities
it tries to counter in the region. Not doing so could become cost-imposing to the United
States over time, and the United States should avoid tying up attention and resources.
Such selectivity should be driven by a strong understanding of China’s and Russia’s goals
in the region and decisionmakers should be especially alert to activities that do not match
those goals. In response, the United States should undertake competitive actions when
Washington assesses its core interests in the region to be at risk.
• The United States might consider prioritizing activities in countries hosting significant
Chinese and Russian activities that run counter to U.S. interests. Top contenders for
future competition are Bahrain, Egypt, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and
the United Arab Emirates, which are also important to core U.S. interests in the region.
• The United States might choose to implement competitive strategies intended to create
dilemmas for Beijing and Moscow that tie up their resources and attention and reduce
their ability to compete. Such competitive strategies in the Middle East would complement those already being implemented in Asia and Europe, and are likely to be lower risk.
• Although the United States might try to counter Chinese and Russian activities, the determinant as to whether any strategic actions succeed or fail is ultimately the countries in the
Middle East. The United States can wield a variety of levers of influence but should weigh
likely regional reactions and the extent to which vital U.S. interests will be safeguardedFinally, although there might be few opportunities, the United States should identify limited areas of cooperation with China and Russia. A cooperative stance could prove more
attractive to countries of the region in some cases and would reduce the risk of them being
forced into a choice and choosing to go against U.S. interests.
The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS)
both feature the concept of strategic competition, defined as a new era of interstate rivalry
characterized by “growing political, economic, and military competitions.”1 These iterations
of the NSS and NDS prioritize long-term strategic competition with great powers over longstanding threats (notably terrorism), a switch from previous strategic guidance.2 The strategies
cite China and Russia as the biggest threats to the United States because of their desires to
export their authoritarian models and erode the U.S.-led international order to gain economic,
political, and military influence over other countries.3 In many respects, the NSS and NDS
herald the return of great-power competition (a peacetime competition between strong states)
and of a multipolar environment for the first time since the Cold War—a paradigm shift from
the low-intensity conflicts against nonstate actors that the United States had been fighting
since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
Emerging from those documents are new efforts to define what strategic competition
actually entails and how the United States can best compete with China and Russia.4 Although
strategic competition is theoretically global in nature, the majority of recent U.S. efforts have
concentrated on Asia and Europe.5 The logic in that approach is that strategic competition is
1 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, D.C., December 2017, p. 2. Also
see U.S. Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening
the American Military’s Competitive Edge, January 20, 2018.
2 For example, see White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, D.C., September 2002; U.S. Department of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, March 2005; U.S.
Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, June 2008; White House, National Security Strategy, Washington, D.C.,
May 2010; U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Defense Strategic Guidance, January 2012.
3 U.S. Department of Defense, 2018, pp. 1–2. The new administration of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., issued a new
strategy document in March 2021. The new document said that the United States was operating in a world of strategic
competition and noted rivalry with China and Russia, but it elevated the challenge of China above that of Russia. White
House, “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance,” Washington, D.C., March 2021, pp. 6, 8, and 20.
4 Uri Friedman, “The New Concept Everyone in Washington Is Talking About,” The Atlantic, August 6, 2019; Michael
J. Mazarr, Jonathan S. Blake, Abigail Casey, Tim McDonald, Stephanie Pezard, and Michael Spirtas, Understanding the
Emerging Era of International Competition: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2726-AF, 2018, p. 2; Katie Bo Williams, “What’s Great Power Competition? No One Really Knows,” Defense
One, May 13, 2019.
5 Ronald O’Rourke, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress, Congressional
Research Service, R43838, Washington, D.C., March 12, 2020, pp. 5–8; Royal United Services Institute, “A Conversation
with the US Secretary of Defense,” London, September 6, 2019; U.S. Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report:
Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region, June 1, 2019a
likely to play out in the backyards of both China and Russia, given their greater interests in
these regions and concerns over U.S. involvement in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. The concentration on these two regions also reflects another common theme of the NDS and NSS:
that the United States has finite resources and therefore must prioritize its activities. However,
in much the same way that the Cold War was fought in peripheral states outside the United
States’ and Soviet Union’s respective spheres of influence, the periphery—such geographic
locations as the Middle East—could once again play an essential role in this new stage of
competition.6
Strategic Competition in the Middle East
Owing in part to its strategic location and abundance of resources, the Middle East has long
been an area of competition for great powers. The “Great Game”—the 19th-century competition between the British and Russian Empires over commercial trade routes, many of which
flowed through the Middle East—took on a new imperative for military transit, overflight,
and basing rights following World War I. Early oil exploration bolstered this dynamic, introducing U.S. companies backed by the U.S. government into the competitive environment.7
World War II reinforced the need for both commercial and military access rights, and the
competition for regional access and influence between the Soviet Union and the United States
became more prominent in the postwar era. The Cold War saw both the United States and the
Soviet Union wield their economic, military, and political power—including sizable military
presence—to bring Middle Eastern states into their respective spheres of influence while denying access and influence to each other.8 As a result, it has long been said that for a country to
be a great power, it must be active and have influence in the Middle East.9
Today, elements of strategic competition as defined by the NSS and NDS appear to
be taking place in the Middle East. China and Russia have both increased their economic
ties to the region and their bilateral and multilateral diplomatic engagement. Moscow, for its
6 This report builds on and complements research that RAND has conducted on strategic competition, particularly as
it relates to Russian and Chinese strategy in the Middle East. For example, see Andrew Scobell, Bonny Lin, Howard J.
Shatz, Michael Johnson, Larry Hanauer, Michael S. Chase, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Ivan W. Rasmussen, Arthur Chan,
Aaron Strong, Eric Warner, and Logan Ma, At the Dawn of Belt and Road: China in the Developing World, Santa Monica,
Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2273-A, 2018; Andrew Scobell and Alireza Nader, China in the Middle East: The Wary
Dragon, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1229-A, 2016; James Sladden, Becca Wasser, Ben Connable, and
Sarah Grand-Clement, Russian Strategy in the Middle East, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, PE-236-RC, 2017;
Becca Wasser, The Limits of Russian Strategy in the Middle East, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, PE-340-RC,
2019. Christine Wormuth, Director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center at RAND, testified recently to
the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa, and International Terrorism on many of the key
themes we explore in this report. See Christine Wormuth, Russia and China in the Middle East: Implications for the United
States in an Era of Strategic Competition, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, CT-511, 2019.
7 For example, the Arabian American Oil Company was established by U.S. oil companies, supported by the U.S. government and Saudi Arabia in 1933. See Ellen Wald, Saudi, Inc.: The Arabian Kingdom’s Pursuit of Profit and Power, New York:
Pegasus Books, 2018.
8 John C. Campbell, “The Soviet Union and the United States in the Middle East,” Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, Vol. 401, May 1972.
9 L. Carl Brown, International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Game, London: IB Tauris Publishers,
1984
part, has attempted to position itself as an alternate weapon provider—and potentially a full
security partner—in the wake of regional states’ displeasure with the depth of U.S. commitments. China has leveraged its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to focus on building economic
partnerships, largely in infrastructure and communications technology.10 These economic ties
have given China a modicum of political influence in the region—particularly with poorer
states—and secured Beijing’s continued access to oil, among its top interests in the region.
Russia, on the other hand, has built outsized political influence on regional states and established itself as an important external power in the region, partly through its intervention in
Syria.
But the Middle East is the crossroads of all three powers—the United States, China, and
Russia—so this competition is more than simply gaining influence: It is also about eroding
the advantages of the other powers. Therefore, many of the Chinese and Russian efforts have
undercut U.S. policy objectives in the region.
Beijing’s numerous deals to build or operate port infrastructure throughout the region
could complicate existing U.S. military access or undermine U.S. attempts to expand access.
Similarly, China’s sale of commercial technologies—such as Huawei’s infrastructure for fifthgeneration mobile telephony (5G) networks—to countries in the Middle East with U.S. bases,
such as Bahrain, poses increased intelligence and collection risks to U.S. military personnel.11
U.S. defense officials have warned that Chinese investments are likely to create opportunities
for economic coercion, often at the expense of these countries’ relationships with the United
States.12
Moscow’s intervention in Syria, shoring up Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime,
challenged U.S. policy to remove Assad from power.13 Moscow’s actions also complicated the
U.S.-led Coalition fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Syria: Russia
added to airspace congestion, and more than 90 percent of its airstrikes in October 2015 were
not striking ISIS territory or ISIS groups, units, or activities.14 As Acting Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Affairs Kathryn Wheelbarger noted, “Russia’s low-cost
intervention in Syria has not only allowed it to buttress the Assad regime, but also to secure
valuable basing locations and increase its convening leverage over regional partners.”15 Additionally, Russia’s break with Saudi Arabia and other OPEC producers in March 2020 has led to
10 BRI was initially called One Belt One Road (OBOR) and is still referred to as such in China.
11 For example, Bahrain struck a deal in March 2019 with Huawei, a Chinese telecommunications company with ties to
the government, to roll out a commercial 5G network despite U.S. warnings that this posed intelligence and collection risks
for the U.S. Fifth Fleet and U.S. service members based in Bahrain. Alexander Cornwell, “Bahrain to Use Huawei in 5G
Rollout Despite U.S. Warnings,” Reuters, March 26, 2019.
12 Aime Williams, “Pentagon Warns of China’s Growing Influence in the Middle East,” Financial Times, August 21, 2019.
13 U.S. policy under President Barack Obama was that Assad should step aside and did not have a role to play in a future
Syrian government. During the Trump administration, U.S. priorities shifted to ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS,
expelling Iranian and Iranian commanded forces, and achieving a political settlement of the Syrian conflict in accordance
with UN Security Council Resolution 2254—tacitly accepting that Assad could remain in power or be part of a future
Syrian government. Macon Phillips, “President Obama: ‘The Future of Syria Must Be Determined by Its People, but President Bashar al-Assad Is Standing in Their Way,’” White House, blog post, August 18, 2011; James F. Jeffrey, “Briefing on
Syria,” U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., November 14, 2018.
14 John Kirby, “Daily Press Briefing—October 7, 2015,” U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., October 7, 2015.
15 Kathryn Wheelbarger, “Russia’s Resurgence in the Middle East: How Does US Policy Meet the Challenge?” keynote
address, Atlantic Council, Washington,
producers flooding the energy market, crashing oil prices and directly threatening the already
overleveraged U.S. oil and gas sector.16 Through these efforts and others, China and Russia are
actively competing with the United States in the Middle East to challenge U.S. interests and
gain advantages in the region.
Enduring U.S. Interests in the Middle East
To better understand why the Middle East has emerged as an arena for strategic competition, it
is essential to understand the core U.S. interests in the region. Although U.S. policies are mutable and vary from administration to administration, these interests have remained constant
and provide the basis for continued U.S. involvement and presence in the region. Elucidating
what these U.S. interests are could also shed light on the strategic approaches that Russia and
China have adopted and the types of actions that they have chosen to undertake in order to
counter—and perhaps even undercut—U.S. influence in the Middle East. These enduring
U.S. interests can be broken into four pillars: ensuring regional stability, maintaining access
to and guaranteeing the free flow of oil for global markets, protecting allies and partners, and
defending U.S. troops in the region.17
A Carter administration official noted in a 1978 congressional testimony that “it is imperative that the United States seek to prevent conflict in the Middle East.”18 At the time of this
statement, interstate conflict between Israel and the Arab states was of chief concern. Although
interstate conflict would remain an issue for the United States—specifically, the Iran-Iraq war
from 1980 to 1988 and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990—it has largely dissipated in recent
years.19 Intrastate conflict and violent extremism have risen and eclipsed interstate conflict as
drivers of regional instability; intrastate conflict has been more recently typified by the civil
war in Syria and the transitions in power in Tunisia and Egypt during the Arab Spring. The
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States and the rise of violent extremist organizations, such as ISIS and Iranian proxy groups, have presented a direct threat to U.S. forces
in the region and to the U.S. homeland.20 Numerous U.S. strategies have sought, through dif-
16 Benoit Faucon, Georgi Kantchev, and Summer Said, “Russia Takes Aim at U.S. Shale Oil Producers,” Wall Street Journal, March 13, 2020. Russia and Saudi Arabia subsequently agreed to a new deal, brokered by President Donald J. Trump
(Clifford Krauss, “Oil Nations, Prodded by Trump, Reach Deal to Slash Production,” New York Times, April 12, 2020).
However, the steep decline in economic activity and travel wrought by the novel coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)
pandemic kept oil prices down for several more months.
17 For a broad discussion of U.S. military interests in the Middle East, see Karl P. Mueller, Becca Wasser, Jeffrey Martini,
and Stephen Watts, U.S. Strategic Interests in the Middle East and Implications for the Army, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND
Corporation, PE-265-A, 2017.
18 Harold H. Saunders, “Statement by Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East Harold H. Saunders,” Review of
Developments in the Middle East, 1978, hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee
on International Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety-Fifth Congress, Second Session, June 12, 1978, p. 3.
19 Although such conflicts do continue, the United States remains a third party in them—for example, providing aerial
refueling and limited support to the Saudi-led coalition in the Yemen conflict. Jeffrey Harrigian, “Department of Defense
Press Briefing by Lieutenant General Harrigian via Teleconference from Al Udeid Airbase, Qatar,” U.S. Department of
Defense, February 13, 2018.
20 Rory Carroll and Joanna Walters, “FBI Investigating San Bernardino Attack as an Act of Terrorism,” The Guardian,
December 5, 2015; Ariane Tabatabai, Jeffrey Martini, and Becca Wasser, The Iran Threat Network (ITN): Four Models of
Iran’s Nonstate Client Relationships, Santa Monica, Calif: RAND Corporation, RR-4231-A, forthcoming erent approaches, to combat terrorism and the spread of radicalism in the Middle East.21 As
these strategies changed, so did U.S. presence in the region. The First Gulf War opened the
region to a permanent basing constellation, particularly in the Gulf. The U.S. invasion of Iraq
in 2003 marked a steep change in U.S. involvement and greatly expanded its role, particularly
in stability operations.
Ensuring access to the Middle East’s vast oil reserves has long been a stated U.S. interest.22 The United States has historically pledged to address threats to the continued free flow
of this natural resource from the Middle East—in part to the United States but especially to
U.S. allies.23 Even as early as 1953, a report to the National Security Council noted that wartime access to oil from the Middle East would be absolutely vital, especially for Europe, so
that “nothing can be allowed to interfere substantially with the availability of oil from those
sources to the free world.”24 Since then, this sentiment has been upheld by numerous U.S.
administrations.25
In 2018, the Middle East supplied less than 8 percent of total U.S. oil consumption and
16 percent of total U.S. imports; likewise, the Middle East sent only 6 percent of its total
exports to the United States.26 China, Europe, India, and Japan received far more crude oil
and oil products from the region than did the United States, which has been dramatically
reducing its dependence on external sources of energy. However, the United States still seeks
to protect energy flows that remain essential to the global economy and the stability of global
markets. Although the nature of the threats to the free flow of energy resources has changed
over time, the United States has demonstrated a continued willingness to protect the commercial shipping of Middle Eastern oil, most notably during the so-called Tanker War during
the Iran-Iraq war of 1980 to 1988. More recently, the United States has pledged to guarantee
safe passage of commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz as part of the International
Maritime Security Construct, formerly known as Operation Sentinel, in light of Iranian maritime provocations.27
The protection of allies and partners in the region first emerged in the form of U.S. public
statements of support for Israel. As the aforementioned official noted in his testimony, “Our
irrevocable commitment to the security, strength, and well-being of Israel has been reaffirmed
21 For instance, the George W. Bush administration adopted the Freedom Agenda, which sought to eradicate factors that
led to terrorism by creating political space in the region, spreading U.S. governance, and reinforcing good governance
while simultaneously intervening in the region to topple Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. White House, “Fact Sheet:
President Bush Calls for a ‘Forward Strategy of Freedom’ to Promote Democracy in the Middle East,” Office of the Press
Secretary, Washington, D.C., November 6, 2003.
22 National Security Council, “Analytical Summary of IG Response to NSSM 66,” Washington, D.C., June 4, 1970; Saunders, 1978.
23 Jimmy Carter, “State of the Union Address 1980,” January 23, 1980.
24 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of the Interior, and U.S. Department of Justice, Report to the National Security Council by the Departments of State, Defense, the Interior, and Justice, Washington, D.C.,
NSC 138/1, January 6, 1953, p. 1321.
25 Leonardo Maugeri, The Age of Oil: The Mythology, History, and Future of the World’s Most Controversial Resource, Westport, Conn., and London: Praeger, 2006.
26 BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019, 68th ed., London, June 2019.
27 C. Todd Lopez, “Esper: Operation Sentinel Prevents Escalation of Middle East Waterways Conflict,” U.S. Department
of Defense, July 24, 2019
by every American administration since the modern State of Israel was born thirty years ago.”28
The Carter Doctrine extended the security umbrella to the Gulf, regarding any “attempt by
any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region . . . as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America” and threatening to repel such an assault “by any means
necessary, including military force.”29 The United States has followed through on this security
guarantee, notably coming to the aid of Kuwait and other Gulf states in the First Gulf War.
To fulfill these commitments, the United States requires continued access and overflight rights
in the region, which have become increasingly essential to global military operations as well.30
The enduring interests of ensuring regional stability and protecting allies and partners
can be seen as coming together in the recent normalization agreements brokered by the Trump
administration in 2020. On August 13 of that year, Israel, the United States, and the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) announced the normalization of relations between Israel and the UAE,
making the UAE only the third Arab country—after Egypt and Jordan—to normalize relations with Israel.31 A few weeks later, on September 11, the White House announced the normalization of relations between Bahrain and Israel, making Bahrain the fourth Arab country
to formally normalize relations with Israel.32 The three Middle Eastern countries—all close
partners of the United States—signed their agreements at the White House on September 15.33
The agreements, designed to strengthen the economies of all three countries, also have a security dimension; they can be viewed to strengthen the security position of these states vis-à-vis
Iran. Because the UAE is a major oil producer (as is the Gulf region), any measures to improve
security should also help safeguard global oil markets, a core U.S. and Gulf Arab interest.
Report Intent, Organization, and Methodology
In this report, we seek to analyze strategic competition in the Middle East among the United
States, China, and Russia. We do so with the intent of informing U.S. policymakers and
defense planners as they work to fulfill the goals of the NSS and NDS and plan for new iterations of these two strategic documents. The fact that U.S. efforts intended to counter China
and Russia focus on competing in Asia and Europe, coupled with a concept of strategic competition that is still being defined, makes it difficult to fully understand how this competition
might play out in the Middle East. Therefore, in this report, we unpack the concept of strategic
competition by detailing the political, economic, and military interests and activities of China
28 Saunders, 1978, p. 3.
29 Carter, 1980.
30 Mueller et al., 2017; National Security Council, 1970.
31 White House, “Joint Statement of the United States, the State of Israel, and the United Arab Emirates,” August 13,
2020b.
32 White House, “Remarks by President Trump on the Announcement of Normalization of Relations Between Israel and
the Kingdom of Bahrain,” September 11, 2020c.
33 White House, “President Donald J. Trump Is Promoting Peace and Stability in the Middle East,” September 15, 2020f.
We refer to the agreements between Israel and Egypt and between Israel and Jordan as peace agreements because Israel had
been in a state of war with those two countries. In contrast, Israel had not been in a state of war with the UAE or Bahrain,
so we refer to those agreements as normalization agreements
nd Russia in the region and identifying where their efforts intersect with U.S. interests and
activities. Research for this report was completed in early October 2020.
We define the Middle East as Egypt, Turkey, the countries and territories of West Asia
(specifically Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories—the West Bank
and Gaza—and Syria), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (specifically Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE), and Yemen. We have excluded the
North African states of Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia in large part to focus on the U.S.
Central Command area of responsibility.34 We chose to focus on the Middle East because it
is a region of interest for all three major powers that is not geographically adjacent to any of
them. All three countries have preexisting levels of influence in the Middle East, so we do not
assert that it is a level playing field. We recognize that the United States has an outsized level
of influence compared with China and Russia. However, the balance of competition in the
Middle East is greater than competition in Asia or Europe. In examining contemporary modes
of competition in the Middle East, we aim to consider the long-term implications of how this
competition might evolve over time. Our goal is to provide U.S. policymakers and planners
with approaches to help the United States better compete with China and Russia in the region.
We drew on a variety of sources for this report. On the qualitative side, these are histories
of the region; policy documents published by the United States, China, and Russia; and analytic reports produced by governments and researchers. We examined reports and research in
Arabic, Chinese, English, and Russian. We also interviewed knowledgeable policymakers and
experts from all three countries and drew on presentations by experts at a variety of conferences. In all cases, we safeguard the anonymity of these sources. On the quantitative side, we
drew from data on economic exchanges and weapon sales, and we constructed new data sets
on senior leader visits to the region. These sources are discussed more fully where they are first
used in the report.
This report is divided into three parts. Drawing on official policy documents and interviews with U.S., Chinese, and Russian academics and policymakers, we first identify Chinese
and Russian views of strategic competition along with regional views of Chinese and Russian
activity in the Middle East. Second, we discuss Chinese and Russian interests in the Middle
East, drawing on the previous sources and on academic literature and policy reports. In this
part of the report, we detail Chinese and Russian political, economic, and diplomatic activities
in the region to identify patterns of activities. In most cases, we focus on bilateral activities.
Broader diplomatic efforts by China and Russia can frame their approaches to the region, but
intraregional competition and diversity of income, economic structure, and even such societal characteristics as religion mean that much of the most important activity takes place on a
bilateral basis.
Lastly, we identify areas of overlap among U.S., Chinese, and Russian activities in the
region to project where, how, and why the three countries might compete in the Middle East.
Notably, prioritization of the competing challenges and responding investments is one of the
34 Although Israel and Turkey were in the U.S. European Command area of responsibility at the time research for this
report was complete, they are essential components of the Middle East in terms of geography and influence. Algeria, Libya,
Morocco, and Tunisia are part of the U.S. Africa Command area of responsibility. On January 15, 2021, the Department of
Defense announced that it had changed the Unified Command Plan and shifted Israel to the U.S. Central Command area
of responsibility. U.S. Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Statement on Unified Command Plan Change,”
Washington, D.C., January 15, 2021
core guiding concepts of the NSS and the NDS.35 In line with this, it is important to recognize
that many of China’s and Russia’s activities to advance their own interests in the region do little
or even no harm to U.S. interests. Even actions that do harm U.S. interests might not be worth
responding to if a response were to cause disproportionate costs to the United States. With this
in mind, and building on the findings of Chapters One through Three, we conclude with a set
of policy recommendations for the United States intended to focus and improve its ability to
compete with China and Russia in the Middle East while securing vital U.S. interests. A separate online appendix provides additional detail regarding (1) Chinese and Russian diplomatic,
economic, and military engagement in the Middle East and (2) areas of strategic competition
among China, Russia, and the United States in that region.
35 U.S. Department of Defense, 2018, p. 1.
When the United States refocused its national security strategy in 2017 to feature strategic
competition, the document highlighted competition in the political, economic, and military
domains.1 This simultaneity of competition across these three domains that affect desired U.S.
interests and outcomes was the heart of the concept.2 Underlying all of those domains was a
focus on technology—especially new technologies, such as autonomy, artificial intelligence,
robotics, and sensors—that would enable the United States to protect what the strategy identified as four vital national interests: protecting the American people, homeland, and way of life;
promoting American prosperity; preserving peace through a strong military; and advancing
U.S. influence in the world.3
The NSS identified China and Russia as first-tier challengers. Of the two, China looms
larger.4 Although Russia presents a more acute short-term military threat, China is economically
and demographically larger, globally engaged, and has been strengthening its armed forces across
all domains of warfare. As a result, China presents a greater threat over the long term.
Building on the new NSS, the NDS noted that strategic competition is occurring across economic, diplomatic, and security domains, and it highlighted the military and defense aspects of
that competition.5 Amplifying the NSS, the NDS also emphasized the importance of technology
to strategic competition: “New technologies include advanced computing, ‘big data’ analytics,
artificial intelligence, autonomy, robotics, directed energy, hypersonics, and biotechnology—the
very technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars of the future.”6
This focus in both documents on China, Russia, and advanced technology seems unconnected to the Middle East, which lags technologically and economically and has been the locus
of two decades of U.S. counterterrorism efforts against violent nonstate groups—an effort
deemphasized in both the NSS and the NDS. Although the Middle East might not feature
prominently in either strategy document, it does fit within the priorities laid out in both of
1 White House, 2017, p. 2.
2 As discussed in Chapter One, we interviewed several people knowledgeable with the formulation of strategy in the
United States, China, and Russia, some of whom were involved in high-level deliberations about those strategies. Information in this chapter about the U.S. view of strategic competition draws from those interviews.
3 White House, 2017, p. 4.
4 Telephone interview with former U.S. national security official, March 2020. Also see James Dobbins, Howard J. Shatz,
and Ali Wyne, Russia Is a Rogue, Not a Peer; China Is a Peer, Not a Rogue: Different Challenges, Different Responses, Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, PE-310-A, 2019.
5 U.S. Department of Defense, 2018, p. 2.
6 U.S. Department of Defense, 2018, p. 3.
9
em. Competition with China and Russia is expected to occur worldwide, including in the
Middle East, and both countries have interests in the region that could run counter to U.S.
interests. Therefore, it is essential to understand how these countries, which the United States
identified as its leading competitors, view strategic competition.
Furthermore, strategic competition is playing out in a region that comprises 16 countries
and territories. These states possess their own interests, which do not always align with those
of the United States despite many of these nations having close relationships with Washington.
Given the agency held by these regional states, it is important to assess their perceptions of
strategic competition and their views of China and Russia.
Chinese Views of Strategic Competition
In the eyes of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rulers of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC), their country is in perpetual competition with other great powers. In their view, the
PRC exists in a world in which only the most-vigilant great powers remain secure and continue
to prosper.7 Therefore, PRC documents routinely reference hegemonistic power politics—with
hegemon referring to other great powers—both in the Asia-Pacific region and in the world
more broadly.8 But the intensity of great-power competition, as well the identity of the PRC’s
top competitor, has changed over time.
During the first 30 years of the PRC’s existence—roughly corresponding to the height of
Cold War tensions, when the country was dominated by leader Mao Zedong—Beijing assessed
that strategic competition was acute, and “war and revolution” were the main trends of the era.9
For two of these three decades, the Soviet Union was the hegemon that most concerned Chinese leaders.10 In the aftermath of Mao’s death in 1976, Beijing undertook a strategic appraisal
and concluded that strategic competition was easing somewhat, the strategic environment had
shifted, and China was ready to enter a new era of “peace and development.”11 After the fallout
from the Tiananmen Square events of 1989, the United States became the focus of concern as
Beijing has become convinced that successive administrations in Washington have sought to
contain China and have worked tirelessly to undermine CCP rule.12
7 Thomas J. Christensen writes that China is the “high church of realpolitik” (Thomas J. Christensen, “Chinese Realpolitik: Reading Beijing’s World View,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 5, September/October 1996, p. 37). This is consistent with
Alastair Iain Johnston’s research on strategic culture: Cultural Realism: Grand Strategy in Chinese History, Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1995.
8 For example, see “Section 1: International Security Situation,” in State Council Information Office of the People’s
Republic of China, China’s National Defense in the New Era, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, July 2019a.
9 Mao Zedong ruled from 1949 to 1976.
10 The United States dominated Chinese threat perceptions from 1949 until the late 1950s.
11 Deng Xiaoping, “Peace and Development Are the Two Outstanding Issues in the World Today, March 4, 1985,” in
Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. III, (1982–1992), Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994, pp. 110–112.
12 For example, see Wang Jisi and Hu Ran, “From Cooperative Partnership to Strategic Competition: A Review of ChinaU.S. Relations, 2009–2019,” China International Strategic Review, July
China in the U.S. National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy
China is cited as a “revisionist power” in the Trump administration’s strategic guidance.13 In
both the NSS and NDS, and reinforced by subsequent statements by senior U.S. officials,
China is the primary threat to the United States, followed by Russia, Iran, North Korea, and
violent extremist organizations. According to the NSS, China is competing “across political,
economic, and military arenas,” to “displace the United States,” and “reorder the [Indo-Pacific]
region in its favor.”14 This regional reordering is one reason why the United States transformed
the U.S. Pacific Command to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command: Doing so was meant to elevate
other potential partners that might play an important role in the competition.15 Furthermore,
the strategic guidance alleges that China’s military modernization and economic expansion
have benefited from access to the U.S. innovation economy and U.S. universities, but, rather
than liberalizing, China has “expanded its power at the expense of the sovereignty of others.”16
The NDS agrees that China is seeking to displace the United States to “achieve global preeminence in the future” and contends that China is attempting to reshape the world order to be
more “consistent with their authoritarian model.”17 The focus on Beijing’s future goals in both
documents has made long-term strategic competition the priority for the U.S. Department of
Defense and for the interagency more broadly.
Chinese Reactions to the U.S. National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy
After the Cold War, Chinese officials determined that great-power competition was continuing,
albeit at a less acute level.18 This did not mean PRC leaders assessed that military conflict was out
of the question. Instead, they assessed that a major global conflict was less likely, although limited
localized wars involving other powers were quite possible.19 Although this assessment gave rise to
the PRC’s decision to concentrate on economic development, it also shifted Beijing’s focus to the
United States as a competitor in both the economic and security spheres.20
To Chinese officials, the nature of the more recent concept of strategic competition is
not unlike the rivalry of the Cold War.21 PRC documents routinely accuse the United States
of maintaining a “Cold War mindset.” Chinese officials view modern strategic competition as
similar to the Cold War in that it is global in scope and not geographically contained to the
Indo-Pacific region.22 To Beijing, Washington is engaged in an ideological competition, intent
13 White House, 2017, p. 25.
14 White House, 2017, p. 25.
15 Telephone interview with former U.S. national security official, March 2020.
16 White House, 2017, p. 25.
17 U.S. Department of Defense, 2018, p. 2.
18 For example, see “Section I: The International Security Situation,” in State Council Information Office of the People’s
Republic of China, China’s National Defense, Beijing, July 1, 1998.
19 For example, see “Section I: National Security Situation,” in State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic,
China’s Military Strategy, Beijing: Xinhua, May 27, 2015.
20 Wang Jisi and Hu Ran, 2019, p. 7.
21 PRC documents routinely accuse the United States of maintaining a “Cold War mindset.” These accusations say as much
about Beijing’s own mindset as it does about Chinese perceptions of U.S. thinking.
22 Minghao Zhao, “Is a New Cold War Inevitable? Chinese Perspectives on US-China Strategic Competition,” Chinese
Journal of International Politics, Vol. 12, No. 3, Autumn 2019, p.
on undermining the political legitimacy of the CCP. Therefore, the popular revolts against
dictatorships around the world—including those in the Middle East (the so-called Arab
Spring)—alarmed PRC rulers, who concluded that these uprisings were either masterminded
or instigated by the United States, similar to views held by their Russian counterparts.23
The public articulation of the Trump administration’s characterization of a world rife with
great-power competition did not surprise PRC leaders. Chinese assessments of regional and global
security environments have become more pessimistic in official documents since the mid-2010s.
This evolution preceded the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the subsequent NSS and NDS
guidance, which Chinese leaders took as confirmation of earlier assessments.24 As one Chinese
scholar notes, “Chinese observers predicted well over a decade ago that US-China relations would
become more competitive.”25 Even so, leaders noted the shift in weight from Russia to China,
having observed Russia as the United States’ main strategic rival before 2017.26
Washington’s articulation of its strategic competition concept served as justification for
the PRC to publish its own review of the state of the international order and the threat posed
by the United States. In a defense white paper published in late 2019—the first such document issued in four years—Beijing declared that “international strategic competition is on the
rise.”27 The document continued: “The US has adjusted its national security and defense strategies and adopted unilateral policies. It has provoked and intensified competition among major
countries.”28As a result of this assessment, Beijing has become more willing to directly challenge Washington and engage in more-overt strategic competition. Under Xi Jinping, the CCP
has articulated a vision of a world order in which China supplants the United States as the
leading global power and the United States must accommodate Chinese interests.29 Although
China sees itself as being in direct strategic competition with the United States, the U.S. publication of the NSS and NDS and the popularization of the strategic competition concept gave
the PRC post hoc justification to publicize this assessment.
Despite viewing international politics in zero-sum terms, Chinese leaders do have a moral
or idealist component to their worldview. Official statements laced with such vocabulary as
“peace,” “harmony,” and “win-win outcomes” are not empty rhetoric. Chinese leaders refer def-
23 For example, see Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, “How China Sees America: The Sum of Beijing’s Fears,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 5, September/October 2012.
24 “Section I: National Security Situation,” in State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic, 2015. This document states, “International competition for the redistribution of power, rights, and interests is tending to intensify.”
25 Minghao Zhao, 2019, p. 373.
26 This observation stems from an interview with Chinese officials in the greater Washington, D.C., area, November 2019.
27 “Section I: International Security Situation,” in State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China,
2019a.
28 “Section I: International Security Situation,” in State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China,
2019a.
29 State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China and the World in the New Era, Beijing, September 2019b. Also see Feng Zhang, “The Xi Jinping Doctrine of China’s International Relations,” Asia Policy, Vol. 14,
No. 3, July 2019, p. 15; Nadège Rolland, China’s Vision for a New World Order, Seattle, Wash.: National Bureau of Asian
Research, Special Report No. 83, January 2020; and Xi Jinping [Ґ䘁ᒣ ], Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era
[Juéshèng quánmiàn jiànchéng xi okāng shèhuì duóq· xīn shídài zhōngguó tèsè shèhuì zh· yì wěidà shènglì,。
SOURCES: Lolita C. Baldor, “U.S. General Says Troop Surge in Middle East May Not End Soon,” Associated Press,
January 23, 2020; Miriam Berger, “Where U.S. Troops Are in the Middle East and Afghanistan, Visualized,”
Washington Post, January 4, 2020; Defense Manpower Data Center, “Military and Civilian Personnel by Service/
Agency by State/Country,” Excel spreadsheet via “DoD Personnel, Workforce Reports & Publications,” webpage,
December 31, 2019; Omar Lamrani, “Naval Update Map: Jan. 23, 2020,” Stratfor, January 23, 2020; Michael
R. Pompeo, “A Force for Good: America Reinvigorated in the Middle East,” Cairo, Egypt, Secretary of State
speech at the American University in Cairo, January 10, 2019; Clayton Thomas, U.S. Killing of Qassem Soleimani:
Frequently Asked Questions, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, R46148, January 13, 2020, pp. 21,
24; U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD Statement on Deployment of Additional U.S. Forces and Equipment to the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” press release, October 11, 2019b; U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation
with Kuwait,” fact sheet, March 20, 2020; U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, “Truman Begins Operations in the
U.S. Fifth Fleet,” December 30, 2019; White House, “Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate,” June 11, 2019b.
NOTES: All numbers have been rounded. The ‘x7’ near Kuwait indicates that there are seven bases in Kuwait.
ARG = Amphibious Ready Group; CSG = Carrier Strike Group
port access agreements with countries in the region (most notably in the UAE), China has
yet to deploy forces there on a permanent basis, instead preferring to use its base in Djibouti
to project power into the region. Russia has, however, secured a relatively limited footprint in
western Syria, in addition to reported outposts and access rights in Egypt.10
Chinese and Russian efforts to erode U.S. competitive advantages fall short of displacing the United States as the outsized external power in the region. The United States is not
the leader in only one area—trade—and this area is admittedly of lower importance to the
United States because it plays only a supporting role in achieving U.S. interests. China and
Russia have obvious advantages with Iran, and that is partly because of a suspension of relations between Iran and the United States.11 Both China and Russia are partners with Iran in
the realms of security, economics, or both, and China and Russia both benefit from promoting low-grade tension between Iran and the United States to draw U.S. attention from other
issues. Although China lags in diplomatic engagement, arms sales, and basing and access in the
region, it exceeds economically—all in line with its stated economic priorities and objective of
achieving power through economics. Russia, for its part, is fairly consistent in its approach to
the region, opportunistically seeking security involvement, military sales, and economic benefits where there are openings but not creating such openings on its own.
This is likely by design (China and Russia benefit from regional stability ensured by continued U.S. military involvement) and in recognition of their narrower objectives. The continued U.S. role as the regional security guarantor requires less economic, military, and political
strain on China and Russia, enabling them to pursue their regional goals while continuing
to focus on their respective backyards, which matter more to their national strategies than
the Middle East does. Furthermore, China and Russia have learned that competing with the
United States does not take much; often, it simply requires being active rather than purposefully attempting to displace and replace the United States.
Areas of Competition Among the United States, China, and Russia
As discussed in Chapter Three and illustrated in the previous section, China’s focus is on economic access while Russia’s approach to the region is primarily concerned with security issues.
To that end, the competitive dynamics confronting the United States differ for each country
(see the box, below). In this section, we seek to identify specific issues that drive competition
between the United States and either China and Russia and between China and Russia them-
Chinese and Russian efforts to erode U.S. competitive advantages fall short of displacing the United States as the outsized external power in the region. Only in two areas—
trade and technology—is the United States not the leader, and trade is of lower importance to the United States, playing only a supporting role in achieving U.S. interests.
While China lags in diplomatic engagement, arms sales, and basing and access in the region, it exceeds economically, in line with its stated priorities and objectives. Russia
is primarily concerned with security issues and opportunistically seeks security involvement, military sales, and economic benefits.
MDIBOU IBOHEATHENSMROD200 400 km
0Saudi ArabiaUAE Oman IraqIran Jebel AliPortQTR Khalifa PortMAPPING CHINA’S "DIGITAL SILK ROAD"Fiber-optic undersea cables:Asia Africa Europe-1 Gulf2Africa-5Bay of BengalGatewayMedNautilusPEACE Cable
Africa-1SeaMeWe-5SeaMeWe-3Transworld
5G networks CT/Communications infrastructure Surveillance equipment
Terrestrial cableBelt and Road Initiative:
Maritime Silk Road Silk Road Economic Belt Port Duqm Port Salalah Port Port Jizan KumportEgyptTurkeyJordanSyria
BHRYemen Haifa Port Ashdod Port Suez CanalIsrael REGIONS
selves. We also identify countries in the Middle East that show the potential for future competition, given the overlap of interests and activities (Figure 4.4).
U.S.-China Competition in the Middle East
U.S. and Chinese competition will likely derive from economic interests. As the head of
U.S. Central Command General Kenneth McKenzie has stated, “We see China moving
in—principally economically, but not completely—to establish a beachhead” in the Middle
East.12 The outcomes of these interests include not only trade and investment, but financing
for and construction of infrastructure. China has also sought to carve a niche market for itself
in the sale of specific weapon systems, particularly when the United States has refused to sell
certain materiel for technology control–regime reasons. Accordingly, the biggest challenges
presented by China in the region are potential limits to U.S. access to ports or other infrastructure, overindebtedness of U.S. partners, weapon sales that undermine U.S. security goals, and
surveillance and intelligence activities via telecommunications and information infrastructure.
Port Infrastructure
China has secured or attempted to secure port access and development projects in the Suez
Canal Economic Zone, Egypt (several investments); Ashdod and Haifa, Israel; Duqm, Oman;
Port Jizan, Saudi Arabia; Kumport, Turkey; and Khalifa, UAE. Although China is developing
these ports for ostensibly commercial purposes, Beijing could eventually use them to project
power and attempt to block U.S. access—as well as surveil U.S. military and commercial shipping patterns.13
The Oman case is instructive to understanding how these ports could emerge as points
of competition between the United States and China. In March 2019, the United States and
Oman signed an agreement that would allow the U.S. Navy port access at Duqm and Salalah.14
Aside from ensuring U.S. access options outside the Strait of Hormuz, the agreement likely
provided a secondary benefit: displacing growing Chinese investment in Duqm—promised
investments total $10.7 billion—to ensure that Beijing does not secure outsized influence over
Oman.15 The United States was able to outposition China for port access rights in Oman, but
China retains development projects at Duqm. Therefore, Oman is also likely to remain an area
of competition.
In recent years, the UAE and Israel have held the greatest potential for future competition
for access between the United States and China. The United States uses the UAE’s deepwater
12 Middle East Institute, “CENTCOM and the Shifting Sands of the Middle East: A Conversation with CENTCOM
Commander Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr.,” transcript, June 10, 2020.
13 Jennifer Aguinaldo, “Chinese Contractor Wins Jizan Port Deal,” MEED, March 6, 2017; Bernd Debussman, Jr., “China’s CSP and Abu Dhabi Ports Launch New Terminal at Khalifa Port,” Arabian Business, December 11, 2018; Nawied
Jabarkhyl, “Oman Counts on Chinese Billions to Build Desert Boomtown,” Reuters, September 5, 2017; Ron Kampeas,
“US Senate Warns Israel Against Letting China Run Haifa Port,” Times of Israel, June 14, 2019; Tahrir Institute for Middle
East Policy, China’s Role in Egypt’s Economy, Washington, D.C., November 21, 2019; Summer Zhen, “Chinese Consortium
to Invest in Turkey’s No 3 Container Terminal,” South China Morning Post, September 17, 2015. China has also signed
Memorandums of Understanding with the Qatar Free Zone Authority; although none focuses on port access, China could
pursue such access in the future. See “Qatar Free Zones Authority Signs MoUs with Leading Entities in China,” Qatar
Tribune, January 31, 2019.
14 U.S. Embassy in Oman, “U.S. Statement on the Signing of the Strategic Framework Agreement,” March 24, 2019.
